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I INTRODUCTION 
Imagine showing a group of friends the joys of the Internet as you prepare to surf your 
favourite bulletin board or discussion group - "Rhubarb". Suddenly, for all the world to 
see (including the gathering of friends behind you) is the following: 
"(Your name) of 123 Computer Co. is a dishonest, 
thieving, lying computer retailer. The hardware is 
either "hot" or used, is sold as new and the software 
is largely pirated from overseas. In addition to 
this, s/he has five children out of wedlock and kicks 
cats for fun. 
Signed - A Concerned (Ex) Customer." 
Assuming none of the above is true, as an aggrieved retailer you are faced with several 
concerns: what can be done to remedy this slur in the first instance; and secondly, who 
should be held responsible for the injury and damage to your reputation that this slight 
will inevitably cause? 
The rapid expansion and novelty of the Internet has led, amongst other things, to a 
tangled web of legal issues. Some of these difficulties are unique to cyberspace and 
arise out of the very elements that characterise the Internet, particularly the ability to 
communicate information around the globe in a fraction of time for minimal outlay. 
The nature and scope of the Internet and its related services presents opportunities for 
mischief; anyone can insert defamatory material about another or in the name of an 
innocent third party. For example, the wording of advertisements can be changed or 
messages can be trapped, amended and then later sent on. This global information 
explosion, coupled with the increasing use of personal computers has meant that the 
laws of all countries of the world are struggling to keep up with the rapid development 
and uses of the Internet. 
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This paper examines a traditional legal concept and attempts to apply it to a dynamic 
revolutionary new method of communication. The discussion advanced throughout this 
paper particularly focuses on difficulties arising from instances of defamation on the 
Internet that originate from bulletin boards, newsgroups and e-mail. In examining this 
topic, Part II of this paper explains the origins and capabilities of cyberspace and the 
Internet. A consideration of the traditional approach to defamation law in New Zealand 
follows in Part III, specifically identifying the purpose, relevant elements and 
limitations of this particular branch of the law. Part IV canvasses policy arguments for 
and against liability of defamatory statements published on the Internet; the 
practicalities of determining who may be liable is considered and relevant case law 
from the United States and Australia is assessed. In evaluating ideas for reform, I have 
concluded this paper by advancing some suggestions which, although not resolving all 
the difficulties highlighted (in this paper), may assist both users and Internet Service 
Providers in avoiding a finding of liability for defamation. 
Academic writing in this area is largely focused on critiques of the case law to date, 
particularly the inadequacies pertaining to the CompuServe and Prodigy decisions 
originating from the United States. In terms of originality, this paper attempts to 
develop the debate a step further by evaluating and developing existing policy 
arguments to suggest ideas for reforming the complex area of defamation and the 
Internet. In addition, precautions service providers might consider adopting are 
suggested as a means of avoiding liability for defamation. 
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II THE INTERNET 
In the last two decades the increased availability of computers has revolutionised 
fundamental methods of communication. Through the use of computers and the 
Internet, more people have direct access to increasing amounts of information. 
A What is Cyberspace and the Internet? 
Cyberspace as a concept and a "place" is the product of the mind of William Gibson, an 
author who began writing novels and short stories in the early 1980s. His 1984 book 
Neuromance/ spoke of the intensity with which people played at and with video games 
and computers; developing a belief of some kind of actual kind of space behind the 
screen - some place that you cannot see, but you know is there. It was this space or 
place that Gibson called "cyberspace", the locale of his novels, a computer-imaged and 
generated landscape which his characters could enter by plugging in. 
As it exists today, the Internet represents the "real" operation of Gibson's ideas as a 
medium of communication which operates at the speed of light and provides access to 
all of the data in all of the computers of humankind. It affords people the opportunity 
to exercise one of our most highly developed capacities, the ability to communicate 
freely with each other, through the Internet. 
The Internet can be described as the ultimate global network. It is an interaction or 
interconnection between computer networks where a set of standard agreements 
(protocols) among thousands of computer networks defines and makes the Internet 
unique.2 These agreements define how the network computers will talk to each other 
and exchange information. The Internet consists of voluntary associations of computer 
networks which, by their very participation, express their willingness to share 
knowledge, resources and ideas. 
William Gibson Neuromancer (HarperCollins, London, 1984) . 
Peter Wiggin Wired Kiwis: Every New Zealander's Guide to the Internet (Shoal Bay Press, 
Christchurch, 1996). 
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To its founders, the Internet constituted a vehicle for communicating information, built 
on the premise that sharing information and ideas would promote science and 
education. The Internet began in the early 1970s as a research initiative by the United 
States military where efforts focused on creating computer networks that could survive 
enemy attack on one or more locations around the country. If, for example, one link in 
the chain of communication was removed or destroyed, the information could still reach 
its intended destination by simply finding another path or way around. The method 
devised was so robust that it soon became a standard for computer communication 
between machines around the world. 
3 Enhancements and upgrades continued 
throughout the mid-1980s when scientific and educational institutions began to realise 
the tremendous possibilities for communications. Today, the Internet's viability has 
been accepted by individuals, small businesses, corporations, governments and 
universities around the world. New Zealand has not ignored this worldwide trend; as of 
July 1996 New Zealand had 77,886 host computers on the Internet, representing over 
120,000 users. 4 Firmly enmeshed in the "worldwide web", the New Zealand trend 
shows no signs of abating; daily more and more New Zealanders add to the growing 
population of over 40 million users in 125 countries. 
5 
The Internet is truly an international structure. It has no base in any one country or 
region, is not owned by anyone and has no controlling computer or governing body. Its 
core activities include services such as electronic mail (e-mail) , newsgroups (electronic 
discussion or bulletin boards), file transfer and on-line conversation (conferencing 
which is typed and immediately displayed to other users of the facility). Electronic 
interactive services such as on-line information are rapidly becoming one of the most 
efficient and prevalent forms of communication providing access across geographical 
boundaries, time, language and race. 
4 
5 
Above n 2, 8. 
Above n 2, 10. 
Jeffrey M Taylor "Liability of Usenet Moderators for defamation published by others: Flinging 
the law of defamation into Cyberspace" (1995) 47 Florida Law Review 247. 
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Communication is via packets of information which are transferred from one place to 
another and operate similarly to a postal service. Each packet of information is placed 
inside an "envelope" which contains both the source and destination address. The 
information is then transported to its destination by communicating with another 
computer on the network. It is then temporarily stored before communicating with a 
third computer until ultimately reaching the end-user whose access to the Internet is via 
an "on-ramp" provided by an Internet service provider. As a post office would sort and 
deliver mail to each house with a unique address, each computer has a unique Internet 
address; deliveries are then forwarded to their intended destination, scanned, 
reassembled and re-imaged on a remote computer screen. 
The Internet symbolises what must be the closest thing any person can get to a wealth 
of infinite knowledge at the touch of a few keystrokes. The Internet's potential is 
slowly being realised and integrated into mainstream society, for example not only can 
you view the latest pictures of Mars or tour the Louvre in Paris, but one can also 
purchase books, order pizzas and even do the grocery shopping over the Internet. 
Despite its large size and increasing worldwide usage, the Internet remains largely 
unregulated. For the Internet to fulfil its potential as a mainstream tool in society, it 
will require some sort of regulation along with other conventional methods of 
communication and broadcasting. The legal implications are numerous and often 
ignored by users, operators and service providers (who supply on-line services as "on-
ramps" into the Internet). Because the Internet is a dynamic creature, changing, 
sometimes significantly, literally each moment, its future is both undefined and 
unknowable. Uncomplicated access and easy reproduction and transfer of information 
open up opportunities for circulation of ideas and information but challenge traditional 
laws that govern communications. The challenge for the legislature, law enforcement, 
Internet service providers (hereafter referred to as "ISP") and Internet users is to reach a 
fair balance between the competing interests of free exchange of ideas, frank and open 
expression and protecting reputations from unwarranted or unjustified attack via the 
Internet. 
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III DEFAMATION LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 
Stephen O'Gorman describes the evolution of defamation law as: 
6 
Historically based on the need to keep the peace, a judicial remedy to stop 
people taking retribution into their own hands, the law of defamation is now 
concerned with the protection of reputation from unwarranted attack. 
At its most basic level, the essence of this branch of tort law can be summarised as 
material that is published about an identifiable person which tends to lower that person 
in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. Assuming all elements of the 
cause of action are proven, any such material is actionable with a remedy in damages 
7 
unless the publisher establishes a defence provided by law. To succeed in an action for 
defamation, the plaintiff must establish the following: 
(a) a defamatory statement has been made; 
(b) the statement is about the plaintiff; and 
(c) the statement has been published by the defendant. 
The enactment, in 1992, of new legislation to amend the law relating to defamation and 
other malicious falsehoods does not attempt to significantly transform earlier 
defamation law. Instead, the Defamation Act 1992 (hereafter "the Act") serves to 
placate previous complexities and ease the rigidity of earlier law.
8 
6 
7 
8 
Stephen O'Gorman "Defamation and the Internet" Internet Australasia (November 1995, 
Volume 1, Issue 11, p 28). 
While not the only remedy provided by the Defamation Act 1992, damages are perhaps the 
most commonly sought form of redress in defamation actions. Typically compensatory in 
nature, an award of damages purports to restore the plaintiff to the position he or she would 
have been in had the defamation not occurred. See further discussion in this paper and Part III 
of the Defamation Act 1992 for additional remedies. 
Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (2 ed, Brooker's Limited, Wellington, 
1997) 853. 
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In particular, the new Act has reformed defamation law m New Zealand m the 
following two relevant ways: 
(1) Section 4 removes the distinction between libel and slander.9 Removal of the 
requirement to allege or prove special damage in slander proceedings now 
means the rules are the same for all kinds of defamation. 
(2) Defamation now only exists as a civil cause of action, a tort. Section 56(2) 
repeals defamation as a criminal offence where publication was deemed likely to 
disturb the peace or would seriously affect the defamed person's reputation. 
As noted above there is no longer a legal distinction in New Zealand between libel and 
slander. 
10 
The following Internet services, however, can be classified as parallel to 
traditional modes of communication and, as such, fall under the defamation umbrella: 
9 
10 
11 
12 
E ·1 ll -rna1 : 
Horne pages: 
On-line chat: 
The ability to make hard copies and circulate widely is 
uncomplicated and should be regarded as the paper 
equivalent to conventional letters; 
Electronic publishing on the "World Wide Web" may 
consist of pictures or words. Humour, cartoons and satire 
can constitute defamation of one's character or traits if 
12 
they cannot be proven true. 
Real-time conversation or text, is similar to slander on a 
telephone system and should be treated as such. 
Halsbury's Laws of England (4 ed, Butterworths, London, 1979) vol 28, Libel and Slander, 
para 1, p 3 defines libel as a defamatory statement made in writing or printing or some other 
permanent form whereby the law presumes damages . Slander, on the other hand, is oral in 
nature or exists in some other transient form and is generally not actionable at common law 
without proof of actual or special damage. 
See s4 of the Act. 
Provided distribution to more than one person occurs e.g. "mail-outs". 
Above n 8, 858. 
Bulletin boards: 
8 
News and varied interest discussion groups can perhaps 
be classified as not dissimilar from broadcasts. 
A Ingredients of the Tort of Defamation 
As noted above, a plaintiff must establish three elements in order to prove a case of 
defamation. 
1 Defamatory statement 
The traditional common law approach to defamation requires the plaintiff be lowered in 
the estimation of society. A defamatory statement may tend to make others shun and 
avoid him or her, or may be calculated to injure the plaintiff's reputation so as to subject 
him or her to ridicule, contempt or hatred.
13 Essentially, a defamatory statement must 
be more than simply false; it must also reflect adversely on the reputation of the 
l . "ff 14 p amtr ·. 
Intention is not a relevant consideration in determining whether a statement constitutes 
defamation. A court will consider what the words actually convey to a reasonable 
person rather than looking to what the defendant intended to impart through the 
publication. Even without intending to defame someone as such, a person will, 
therefore, remain liable for material which is defamatory in nature. 
Using the example in Part I of this paper to illustrate defamation in the context of the 
Internet, a statement exists which is clearly defamatory of the plaintiff. The impact of 
such allegations, which appear on a widely read bulletin board, is likely to not only 
lower the plaintiff in the eyes of the public, but also cause others to treat him or her 
with contempt or be shunned and avoided. Not only is the statement false, it is likely to 
have serious repercussions for the plaintiff's personal and business reputations by 
13 
14 
Above n 8, 854. 
Above n 9, para 6, p 5. An action for defamation does not lie in respect of defaming a dead 
person. 
9 
alleging, as a statement of fact, the plaintiff's propensity for immoral acts and lack of 
business ethics. 
2 Identifying the plaintiff 
The plaintiff must prove the published words are defamatory of him or her, namely that 
it is the plaintiff who has been defamed. The requisite test is "whether reasonable 
persons would reasonably believe that the words referred to the plaintiff" .
15 As a result, 
even accidental references to the plaintiff, for example someone with the same name or 
whose circumstances fit the situation, will fall into this category. In addition, a 
company can bring an action in defamation where statements affect its business or 
d
. . 16 
tra mg reputation. 
Again using the above example to demonstrate the Internet context, it is a relatively 
simple task to construe the note appearing on the bulletin board as referring to the 
plaintiff. As the requirement for a defamatory statement has been met above, this limb 
identifying the plaintiff constitutes the second element of a successful defamation 
action. In addition, a person of the same name operating a computer company of the 
same name, even on the other side of the world, will also have grounds for a defamation 
action against the defendant even though the material is not meant to refer specifically 
to them. The fact that a defamatory statement exists and a reasonable person could 
believe it to refer to a second person on the other side of the world leaves the defendant 
open to further liability. 
3 Publication by defendant 
The third ingredient the plaintiff is required to establish is that the statement is 
published to a third person, namely to someone other than the plaintiff. Whether the 
facts constitute publication is a question of law to be decided by the Judge. Publication 
15 
16 
Above n 8, 871. 
For a recent New Zealand example where a company's trading reputation was at stake, see 
Mount Cook Group Ltd v Johnstone Motors Ltd [1990] 2 NZLR 488. 
10 
can be made through the media to a wide audience or can be in the form of disclosure to 
one other person or a small group. 
17 In addition, repetition of a statement constitutes a 
new publication and consequently a new cause of action exists against the party 
repeating or republishing the statement. 
It is this third ingredient of defamation that poses many of the obstacles likely to arise 
in an Internet context. First, an issue exists in terms of publication and whether 
material that can be accessed via the Internet constitutes publication as such. A matter 
for particular concern is whether, in merely being a vehicle for providing access to the 
Internet, an ISP can be deemed to have "published" the information at issue. In this 
respect, I would suggest that it is neither practical nor equitable to place responsibility 
for all Internet content with ISPs. I would submit that rather, they should be 
responsible for material originating at their site. Similarly with e-mail transmissions, an 
ISP merely provides the facility and should not therefore be liable for any defamatory 
material that is transmitted. The missing ingredient is the ability to exercise control. 
A second difficulty lies in identifying the author or publisher: the nature and scope of 
the Internet means opportunities for tracing the original author may be limited and 
presents practical difficulties in a technical sense. Laying blame at the feet of a service 
provider, even if the organisation had no viable means of knowing about the 
defamatory matter, therefore, may prove to be the only recourse available that an 
aggrieved person has in terms of vindicating the wrong. Finally, as the Internet knows 
no bounds and exists in a borderless environment, a significant problem is presented 
when consideration is given to the fact that publication can occur simultaneously in 
different legal jurisdictions. The difficulty from this point of view is determining 
which, if any, law is applicable to the situation. Specific issues arising from identity, 
knowledge and jurisdiction are discussed in greater detail in Part IV of this paper. 
17 Above n 8, 878. 
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B Innocent Dissemination 
Particularly relevant to the scope of this paper is section 21 which provides a defence to 
persons who have published matter in the capacity of, or as employee or agent of, a 
processor or distributor.
18 Persons involved in "innocent dissemination" can avail 
themselves of this defence by proving:
19 
"(a) That that person did not know that the matter contained the maten·al that 
is alleged to be defamatory; and 
(b) That that person did not know that the matter was of a character likely to 
contain material of a defamatory nature; and 
(c) That that person's lack of knowledge was not due to any negligence on 
that person's part. " 
When considering an action concerning defamation and the Internet, an issue arises as 
against whom a probable cause of action might lie. Defamation law attributes 
maximum liability to the originating author of published defamatory statements. 
Secondary publishers, such as booksellers and newsagents, however, are not liable if the 
publication is deemed to be innocent.
20 This means that liability would accrue if a 
publisher in this sense knew or should have known the material contained defamatory 
matter. 
Pertinent to the example at the beginning of this paper, assuming the "Concerned (Ex) 
Customer" is unable to be traced or identified, the plaintiff, in seeking to vindicate their 
reputation, may seek to bring proceedings against those who handle information that 
appears on the Internet (for example, bulletin board or discussion group monitors, their 
employers or the providers of the particular service). If this occurs, service providers 
will argue they come within the scope of the defence provided by section 21. This 
presents the problem that, despite its recent enactment amending previous anomalies in 
18 
19 
20 
Section 2(1) defines "distributor" as including a bookseller or librarian and "processor" as a 
person who prints or reproduces, or plays a role in printing or reproducing, any matter. 
See s21. 
Above n 19. 
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the law, the Defamation Act 1992 is not worded with the Internet in mind. The issue 
whether ISPs are covered by the defence in section 21 has yet to be determined in the 
New Zealand courts. However, it is likely that a New Zealand court would follow the 
lead of United States and Australian determinations in making the defence of innocent 
dissemination available in an Internet context. The inappropriateness of marrying 
current defamation law with such a dynamic creature as the Internet is discussed more 
fully later in this paper. 
C Remedies 
Remedies for defamation are set out in Part III of the Act. In an action for defamation, 
damages constitute the most common form of redress and are awarded to compensate 
the plaintiff for: 
(1) the injury to his or her reputation; and 
(2) the hurt to his or her feelings. 
The underlying purpose of compensating the victim is to vindicate the plaintiff to the 
public and attempt to restore him or her to the position he or she was in, had the 
defamation not occurred. 
D Defences 
Part II of the Act provides a number of recognised defences to an action of defamation, 
namely truth, honest opinion, and absolute and qualified privilege. The two most 
pertinent defences relating to subject matter considered in this paper are set out below. 
13 
I Truth 
Previously known as the defence of justification, this defence will only succeed if the 
defendant can satisfy the court that the imputations were either true or the substance is 
not materially different from the truth.21 The rationale behind this defence lies in the 
notion that a person is entitled only to a reputation worthy of their behaviour. 
Therefore, if the computer retailer in the example already mentioned was found to be 
dealing in pirated or second hand goods and selling them as new and legitimate licensed 
software, the alleged wrongdoer would have a defence to the charge of defamation as 
the accusations are truthful. Similarly, if the plaintiff only has four children out of 
wedlock or kicks guinea pigs for amusement, because the substance of the imputations 
is not materially different from the truth, the defence will still apply. 
2 Honest opinion 
Prior to the commencement of the 1992 Act, this defence was known as the defence of 
fair comment. The defence of honest opinion embodies the very essence of free speech: 
the idea that citizens should be able to express their views freely without fear of 
retribution or censorship. Sections 9 to 12 of the Act specify a number of conditions 
which must first be complied with before the defence of honest opinion will succeed. 
(a) The opinion must be genuine 
Section 10 requires the opinion expressed to be the genuine opinion, and recognisable 
as such, of the defendant. Further, the existence of malice in motivating publication 
will not preclude a defence of honest opinion. 
(b) The opinion must be based on true facts 
Section 11 provides the defendant prove only those statements of fact which are 
relevant and form the basis of the opinion. Proof of the truth of any statement of fact 
not related to the opinion is not required. 
21 Sections 8(3)(a) and 8(3)(b). 
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While the overall effect of the new legislation cannot be said to have completely 
reformed the law of defamation in New Zealand, it has attempted to simplify some of 
the more complex areas of the law. Protecting one's reputation from unjustified 
malignment is both important and necessary in today's society. However, finding the 
balance between protecting one's reputation and freedom of expression (which has 
come to be accepted as an integral feature of the Internet) is not without complications. 
Tipping the balance too far toward protecting reputations is arguably a breach of s14 of 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990; freedom of expression is defined in that 
section as "including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions 
of any kind in any form." This provision would therefore cover any information on the 
Internet and other on-line systems. These and other difficulties are compounded when 
existing legislation is mapped onto new, dynamic technologies and methods of 
communication, such as that characterised by the Internet, which the legislation does 
not specifically take into account. 
In terms of the scope of this paper, a primary publisher will be in a better position to 
point to the truth behind an alleged defamatory statement. As the first author, a primary 
publisher may also be able to identify information which clarifies the statement as being 
his or her honest opinion. The situation becomes more complex when considering the 
position of secondary publishers such as ISPs. In the first instance, it would be difficult 
for an ISP to absolve itself from liability by proving the truth of the imputation. An 
ISP is unlikely to possess any knowledge about the background of the parties involved 
and would be hard pressed to verify each piece of information that passed through its 
services due to the sheer volume and speed with which information can be uploaded. 
Similarly, a further problem exists with the defence of honest opinion in that the 
statement is not that of the ISP but rather belongs to the original author. It is unlikely 
that an ISP, as a secondary publisher, would be able to engage this defence because the 
statement is clearly not the genuine or honest opinion of the ISP. As a result, it is 
unreasonable and impractical to expect a service provider to defend a charge of 
defamation using either of these existing defences. 
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IV POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST LIABILITY 
FOR DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS ON THE INTERNET 
The Internet poses profound challenges to fundamental requirements for any effective 
law. Where publication of defamatory statements over the Internet occurs, three core 
issues arise when considering the likelihood of a successful legal action; namely, 
identifying the wrongdoer, the level of knowledge that is required to satisfy a finding of 
liability in a defamation action; and complications that exist due to different legal 
jurisdictions. 
A Originating Author 
It is clear law that a prima facie case of strict liability rests with the originating author 
or publisher for initial defamatory publications. The structure of the Internet, however, 
means that often an original author will be anonymous or hiding behind a pseudonym 
so that the origin of the defamatory message may be untraceable. For any law to be 
enforceable there must be an identifiable person to whom liability is attributed. On the 
Internet, however, one's virtual personality can be hidden, altered and falsified with no 
simple method of linking a person's on-line identity and the real person. In cases where 
it is possible to identify an original author, however, case law suggests that liability may 
be fixed relatively easily against the alleged wrongdoer. 
The Australian case of Rindos v Hardwick2
2 is one of the first reported cases involving 
defamation and electronic newsgroups and confirms the application of defamation law 
to material published in cyberspace. The plaintiff (Rindos), an internationally 
renowned anthropologist, was denied tenure and dismissed from the University of 
Western Australia for insufficient productivity. In response to this, an American 
criticised the University of Western Australia's actions via an anthropology bulletin 
22 (Unreported judgment 940164, 31/3/94, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Ipp J). 
16 
board. 23 The defendant, Hardwick, replying in his own name, posted his personal views 
on the matter alleging that Rindos had engaged in sexual misconduct with a local boy 
"Puppy" and further, that the anthropologist had no genuine academic ability and relied 
on bullying and berating others rather than immersing himself in appropriate research. 
The Supreme Court of Western Australia found in favour of the plaintiff, granting him 
$40,000 in compensation to vindicate his reputation to the public.
24 Justice Ipp found 
Hardwick's posting to have seriously defamed the plaintiff; the inference being that the 
matters had a bearing on his failure to be awarded tenure. Because the imputations 
were published in academic circles and Rindos had a high international standing, the 
defamatory remarks were likely to have harmful effects, causing damage to both 
Rindos' personal and professional reputation. 
The effect of the Rindos decision is significant in several ways. First, the decision 
confirms the application of defamation law to new methods of communication such as 
the Internet. Secondly, any doubt that a news item on an electronic bulletin board 
constitutes publication is removed and; thirdly, that an author, once identified, will be 
held liable for publishing defamatory material on the Internet. 
B The Position of ISPs 
The issues become more complex when we consider liability that is removed from the 
original author of defamatory material. As discussed above, it may be problematic to 
prove a particular individual, as opposed to a particular computer, actually sent the 
offending message. For example, assuming the computer with the originating message 
can be identified, it may be difficult to isolate the offending person in the absence of a 
signature or system requiring the use of individual (as opposed to company) passwords. 
The complexity of the situation is further compounded when computers with access to 
Internet and e-mail facilities are freely available for employee use which makes it even 
23 
24 
Evidence revealed that approximately 23,000 people worldwide had access to the particular 
bulletin board; messages could remain in the system for days and even weeks depending on 
computer capacity and volume of messages; and further, items of interest could be printed on 
hard copy and redistributed. 
In this case the defendant did not enter an appearance. Judgment by default was consequently 
granted to the plaintiff. 
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more difficult to trace the author. Situations such as the one just described with no 
safeguards in place, leave employers vulnerable as the owner of the computer in 
defamation proceedings. In addition, an author probably cannot pay more than a 
modest award should they find themselves embroiled in defamation litigation. Given 
the perception of deeper pockets and likelihood of insurance cover, ISPs, owners and 
operators of computers may therefore find themselves exposed as unwilling participants 
in the litigation. 
1 ISPs as actual publishers 
An issue arises as to whether an ISP, in providing an access ramp onto the Internet, 
should be characterised as a primary publisher (for example, as a newspaper or 
broadcaster) of defamatory statements accruing maximum liability as if the ISP were 
the actual speaker and akin to a real world publisher. As a matter of policy and in terms 
of practicality, it will be necessary for the courts to establish to what extent, and indeed 
whether, an ISP has the ability to edit or screen Internet material that it purports to 
exercise control over. The question to be decided is whether an ISP can be 
characterised as part of the publication process and therefore liable as a party to the 
publication. Each service provider's involvement with information, however, will vary. 
Liability will depend on the extent of involvement and the control that each service 
provider exercises. I wouid contend that where information from a third party is made 
available via the Internet by an ISP and there is no direct control over the information 
that materialises, the ISP ought to then be categorised as a distributor within the 
principle of innocent dissemination in section 21 of the Act. 
2 ISPs as mere distributors 
A further issue in the primary and secondary publisher debate is whether liability 
should merely extend to a distributor standard, for example, as a bookseller or 
newsagent. Classification as a secondary publisher or distributor (under the defence of 
innocent dissemination) offers greater legal protection to an ISP, conferring liability 
18 
only for statements the ISP knew, or ought to have known, were defamatory. As will 
be discussed later in this paper, knowledge in this respect may be difficult to prove. 
A distributor type framework is concerned with principles protecting the free exchange 
of ideas and information. Placing restrictions on booksellers, for example, confers an 
onus on them to be aware of the contents of all books in their possession. As a result, 
placing restrictions on a bookseller subsequently impedes public access to printed 
matter.
25 A publisher framework on the other hand requires communication to a third 
party to constitute "publication". Each party with a role in the publication process, 
therefore, can be held liable for publication. This analysis treats the publishing party as 
analogous to a newspaper; as there is an ability to edit or screen for potentially 
defamatory matter, the newspaper or broadcaster will be answerable for any 
publications deemed to be defamatory.
26 
While limited in number and still in a stage of infancy in relation to development of the 
law, cases emerging from the United States and Australia appear to have determined 
contradictory extremes in terms of the publisher and distributor debate. The first two 
cases originate from the United States where: first, an on-line service provider is held as 
the functional equivalent of a mere "distributor" of news; and conversely there is 
authority in a second case for the proposition that the standard of liability to be imposed 
is that of publisher. A third case illustrates an Australian High Court decision where the 
defence of innocent dissemination failed. 
(a) 27 Cubby, Inc. v CompuServe Inc. 
CompuServe developed and provided an on-line general information service that 
subscribers could access from a personal computer. In exchange for a membership fee 
and on-line time usage fees, subscribers had access to over 150 special interest forums 
such as topical databases, interactive conferencing and electronic bulletin boards. At 
issue were the contents of a journalism forum "Rumourville", the content of which 
25 
26 
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Matthew C Siderits "Defamation in Cyberspace: Reconciling Cubby, Inc v CompuServe, Inc 
and Stratton Oakmont v Prodigy Services Co" (1996) 79 Marquette Law Review 1065, 1071. 
Above n 25, 1072. 
(1991) 776 F Supp 135. 
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CompuServe contracted with a separate company to edit, review and control. This 
arrangement meant that CompuServe had no opportunity to review the contents of 
Rumourville before it was uploaded and immediately available on-line. A rival 
database claimed that Rumourville had published false and defamatory statements about 
it and that CompuServe carried these as part of its journalism forum. CompuServe 
contended their position as a distributor rather than publisher, denying liability as they 
neither knew, nor had reason to know, of the defamatory statements. 
In this motion for summary judgment, Leisure J found CompuServe's product to be an 
electronic for-profit library with no more editorial control than a traditional news 
vendor, library or book store. Furthermore, a lower standard of liability would impose 
an undue burden on the free flow of information as it would not be feasible for 
CompuServe to examine all publications. The appropriate standard of liability, 
therefore, was held to be that of distributor. Having no knowledge nor any reason to 
know of the alleged defamatory statements, especially given the large number of 
publications and the speed with which Rumourville was uploaded and available to its 
subscribers, Leisure J found CompuServe not liable in the absence of any fault. 
(b) Stratton Oakmont v Prodigy Services Co
28 
This case involved statements about the plaintiff company made by an unidentified 
"poster" on Prodigy's "Money Talk"; the leading and most widely read computer 
bulletin board in the United States, comprising some 60,000 messages daily. In its 
promotions, Prodigy declared itself a family oriented computer network, holding itself 
out as an on-line service which exercised stringent editorial control over content. In 
expressly differentiating itself from competitors, Prodigy was held at the same time to 
have expressly likened itself to a newspaper. Content guidelines stated any postings in 
bad taste would be removed when brought to Prodigy's attention; software screening 
programmes were used to filter out offensive language; duties of Board Leaders 
included enforcing Prodigy's guidelines and an emergency delete button enabled Board 
Leaders to remove notes. 
28 (1995) 23 Media L Rep 1794. 
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On the above factual analysis, the Supreme Court held that in using manpower and 
technology, Prodigy was clearly making decisions as to content and that these decisions 
constituted editorial control and judgement, necessitating a finding of increased 
liability. In effect, Prodigy had created an editorial staff of Board Leaders who had 
continual monitoring ability; as agents, Prodigy was vicariously liable for their actions. 
The outcome of exercising editorial control confers publisher status on Prodigy with the 
same responsibilities as a newspaper. 
(c) Thompson v Australian Capital Television29 
In this decision of the Australian High Court, the majority advocates the proposition 
that "broadcasters" of information are required to exercise due care when broadcasting 
material that is likely to be controversial and/or defamatory. In this case, the plaintiff 
sued over a television programme broadcast by the defendant with a licence agreement 
allowing it to broadcast from a Sydney television station. In mounting a distributor 
type argument, Australian Capital Television argued its role as that of merely effecting 
transmission and; further, that nothing in the licence agreement entitled it to vary the 
material transmitted. The High Court rejected this reasoning to hold that the defendant 
did not resemble a distributor and; further, that its lack of knowledge of defamatory 
material was due to its own negligence. 
30 
It is pertinent at this stage to attempt a critique of the American case law. As it stands, 
the law is uncertain and inconsistent. Academic comment suggests that a combination 
of the CompuServe and Prodigy decisions will result in ISPs adopting a hands-off 
approach to communication via their bulletin board and newsgroup related services 
which, ultimately, may result in increased defamation on the Internet.
31 The rationale 
behind this is that service providers will not take positive action or make attempts to 
screen out defamatory material for fear they will be subject to a publisher standard of 
29 
30 
31 
(1994) 54 FCR 513. 
If the defendant had proven it was not possible to monitor the programme in any practical 
sense, it is arguable it may more easily have established it was not negligent in failing to 
regulate the contents . 
See Stephen Dooley "Dealing with defamation on the internet" (1996) 140 Solicitors Journal 
46 and R Timothy Muth "Old Doctrines on a New Frontier - Defamation and Jurisdiction in 
Cyberspace" at http://www.rbvdnr.com/Jit/defame.html. 
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accountability. This, however, will depend on personal choices made by ISPs in 
relation to their decisions to edit bulletin boards and newsgroups. In making the 
decision to take an overtly hands-off approach to editing Internet material, an ISP may 
not be liable for defamatory content. Similarly, the decision to exercise editorial 
control may increase the likelihood of liability being found against an ISP. 
It is important to note, however, that both the CompuServe and Prodigy decisions are 
dependent on very specific facts. The examples of CompuServe ' s business being 
characterised by a contractual agreement with an outside company to review and 
control the journalism forum and Prodigy holding itself out as a service that exercised 
rigorous editorial control, are very specific to the individual cases and do not 
necessarily formulate a blanket precedent for future cases. In response to a complete 
hands-off stance on the part of service providers, bulletin board hosts or network 
administrators, however, it may be that a decision of this sort leaves these parties 
susceptible to negligence claims. The decision to adopt a hands-off approach may, 
therefore, have ramifications for other aspects of the law depending on whether it 
would be reasonable to expect an ISP to exercise some forms of control rather than 
none at all. Assuming this to be the case, then the choice not to exercise control where it 
would seem reasonable to do so, may be negligent. 
Further obstacles encountered in the case law, particularly the Prodigy decision, 
comprise the fact that while newspaper staff have the tools to check the accuracy of the 
material published, a bulletin board operator does not have the same practical means of 
doing so. The sheer volume and speed of messages posted to any one bulletin board 
would render it close to physically impossible to screen every posting for defamatory 
content. Even if effective screening was able to be carried out, be it random or 
otherwise, the person monitoring may well not be in a position to determine the truth of 
any background information that exists which might constitute a defence under Part II 
of the Act in an action for defamation. 
The freedom of expression and exchange of information that users have come to accept 
and expect on the Internet is also likely to be stifled. Implementation costs are also 
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likely to be phenomenal: the initial cost of setting up monitoring and control functions 
which, in conjunction with lost subscribers who object to on-line surveillance, is 
unlikely to be recovered. 
Finally, variations in judicial opinion regarding the defence of innocent dissemination 
between the United States and Australia highlight further problematic consequences for 
defamation and the Internet; namely jurisdiction and the issue of forum shopping. 
While not forming a core part of this paper, these issues are expanded on in a later 
section. 
As discussed above, a degree of legal protection may be afforded to parties who can be 
classified as innocent disseminators or distributors. For parties falling into this 
category, liability for defamatory statements will attach only in instances where the 
party knew or had reason to know of the existence of the defamatory material. Because 
the foundations of the Internet are so innovative and distinct from traditional entities 
that defamation law might be applied to, simply mapping the existing legal framework 
(which does not specifically provide for cyberspace) onto the Internet is problematic. 
One major obstacle faced by the Internet is the difficulty in attributing knowledge on 
the part of an ISP. 
Cyberspace allows individuals the opportunity of publication to an international 
audience. Many of these people will not be versed in defamation law, have ready 
access to lawyers for advice, nor have the resources to compensate someone harmed by 
the statements they make. Extraordinary amounts of information and data are 
constantly uploaded into the infinite realms of cyberspace. The majority of computer 
information services will allow users to upload information onto the service often 
without vetting or first screening content.
32 As a result, ISPs will often have no 
knowledge of the content and type of material passing through their sites, let alone the 
means or ability to find out. Yet because of the difficulties associated with locating and 
32 An obvious exception to this relates to information placed by the service provider or operator, 
for example databases such as LEXIS and WestLaw. See Timothy Arnold-Moore "Legal 
Pitfalls in Cyberspace: Defamation on Computer Networks" (1994) 5 Journal of Law and 
Information Science 165. 
23 
identifying a hidden or anonymous content provider, it will often be a blameless, yet 
identifiable, service provider from whom redress is sought. 
As described at the beginning of this paper, anonymous authors clearly have 
opportunities for mischief-making on the Internet. Stephen O'Gorman stresses that 
identification and knowledge may be difficult to prove to the standard required by law. 
In questioning the application of law in cyberspace, he contends that if liability cannot 
be attributed then defamation law, as applying to the Internet, is undermined. Further, 
he argues that if a person's reputation can be so devalued by unpunished attacks then the 
rationale for penalising an identifiable author becomes less clear.
33 
The current regime of defamation law does not adequately represent the realities of 
service providers and operators on the Internet. Future courts will have to examine the 
nature and extent of editorial control that is exercised. Given the increasing availability 
and expansion of the Internet, and the impracticalities that exist relating to the extent of 
knowledge ISPs are required to possess , it is suggested that it is an onerous burden to 
place responsibility at the feet of service providers for all material freely available over 
the Internet. 
C Conflict of Laws, Jurisdiction and Forum Shopping 
While a full discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to identify the 
impact of this further complication as it affects the question of defamation and the 
Internet. The borderless nature of the Internet means that cyberspace poses critical 
questions about conflict of laws, jurisdiction, choice of law and forum shopping. In 
particular, it can be argued that the global nature of the Internet has opened the way to 
forum shopping. Internationally, the degree to which countries protect their citizens 
against defamation and the level of damages awarded in defamation actions varies 
greatly. The result may be that potential plaintiffs in Internet defamation actions will 
initiate proceedings in jurisdictions with the most restrictive defamation laws. 
33 Above n 6. 
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In an Internet defamation action, choices of law will be available because the act of 
defamation occurs in many states or countries simultaneously. The plaintiff may be 
entitled to sue in any state in which he or she can prove that someone received the 
defamatory message. Conflict of laws is concerned with cases having a foreign 
element; that is, contact with a system of law other than that of the particular country. 
Such contact, in the context of defamation and the Internet, exists because the tort was 
committed there.
34 
Conflict of laws is a necessary part of the law of every country. 
Different countries operate different legal systems containing unique legal rules and 
adjustment is necessary between them when events are not confined within the borders 
f . l 35 o a singe country. This point is particularly relevant to the Internet given its 
universal scope and disregard for international boundaries. 
In terms of jurisdiction, Halsbury's Laws of England asserts liability for defamation 
claims are governed by domestic law if the alleged tort occurred in New Zealand. If the 
alleged tort was committed overseas, then common law choice of law rules apply. The 
tort of defamation is further deemed to have been committed in the place into which, as 
opposed to the place from which, the defamatory material is communicated.36 In 
addition, where a New Zealand court and a court of another country have jurisdiction to 
hear and determine the proceeding, the forum conveniens is the forum in which the 
proceeding could be more suitably tried in the interests of the parties and in the interests 
f
. . 37 
o Justice. 
Because single pieces of information are likely to be published simultaneously in 
multiple countries over the Internet, it is clear from the above that an action may be 
brought in one country and damages sought with respect to publications in other 
jurisdictions. The possibility exists, for example, for each publication of defamatory 
material to be subject to separate actions against publishers around the world. The 
effect of this means global liability is opened up wherever each publication is received 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Ha!sbury 's Laws of England (4 ed reissue, Butterworths, London, 1996) vol 8(1), Conflict of Laws, 
para 601, p457. 
Above n 34, para 602, p457. 
Above n 34, para 896, p667. 
The Laws of New Zealand Volume 7, Conflict of Laws: Jurisdiction & Foreign Judgments 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 1996). 
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around the world. Indeed, in the Rindos38 decision, Judge Ipp considered the 
ramifications of wide publication in assessing the damages payable. 
New Zealand's law of jurisdiction derives partly from statute (which has overriding 
force) and partly from precedent. 39 Service can be effected whenever the defendant or 
his/her agent is in New Zealand. Similarly, if the defendant submits to the jurisdiction 
of a New Zealand court, a court may be vested with jurisdiction. According to the High 
Court Rules, service overseas is allowed without the leave of the court.40 As far as 
Internet defamation is concerned, Rule 219(a) allows "statements of claim ... to be 
served out of New Zealand without leave of the Court, where any act or omission for or 
in respect of which damages are claimed was done or occurred in New Zealand." This 
subsection appears to be directly applicable to the Internet defamation context. Rule 
219(a) would apply in the case of alleged defamation as any publication on the Internet 
may simultaneously appear on New Zealand computer screens and, therefore, 
communication of the defamatory material would occur in New Zealand. 
Again, while the not the subject of this paper, the issue of forum shopping where a 
plaintiff can choose a jurisdiction with the fewest defences or narrowest interpretation 
of them will need to be addressed. 41 Allowing claimants a choice of jurisdiction where 
the law is likely to be more amenable to their defamation claim is an undesirable 
manipulation of the law. It is difficult to perceive a means of avoiding this given that 
different jurisdictions are inevitably involved when considering the Internet. In 
summary, therefore, electronic communications create difficulties in applying 
traditional choice of law rules to a tort that may have little relation to a single 
geographical area. A New Zealand court would be required to develop new methods of 
dealing with this problem. 
38 
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V REFORM PROPOSALS 
Current legal principles in relation to publication and communication were designed 
pre-cyberspace and have limited ability to embrace the revolutionary fundamentals of 
the Internet. The law needs clarification in order to remove the turmoil that surrounds 
defamation without stifling the advantages derived from unencumbered electronic 
communication. Rather than contorting existing law to encompass the domain of 
cyberspace, contemporary and innovative solutions (such as the Internet itself) need to 
be considered. 
A Reform Options 
There are many and varied options for reforming defamation and the Internet. Because 
the Internet is a dynamic and evolving creature, there is unlikely to be a solitary 
effective solution. Academic discussion has considered self-regulation of the Internet;42 
a new tort of defamation arising out of moderated newsgroups;43 legislative clauses to 
reform the defence of innocent dissemination;44 and even a Cyber-court.45 
1 Self-regulation 
The most avid users of the Internet would like the law to stay outside of their domain, 
leaving the people who best comprehend it, namely users, to solve their own 
quandaries. Legislation is seen as an unworkable onslaught into the core principles 
underlying the Internet, specifically freedom of expression and open, unregulated 
discussion of ideas. 
42 
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See for example, above n 5, 
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The advent of mobile telephones was such a novelty that, at the time, no one seemed to 
mind how or when they were used. Today, these devices are a part of normal life and 
their novelty value has been replaced by concerns for their use. For example, a 
rudimentary form of mobile phone etiquette is developing which makes society frown 
on their use on public transport, in movie theatres or at restaurants where their use can 
annoy and disturb others. Similarly, on the Internet there is a form of "netiquette" or 
protocols to which the Internet community subscribes governing how users interact with 
46 the system and each other. 
Extending this unwritten code of conduct into the area of defamation might mean that if 
a user was found to be in breach of "netiquette", then they may be greeted with a 
barrage of "flames" (copious amounts of ungracious replies). In addition to this, and 
perhaps a more expedient approach, is vindication through the Internet forum itself in 
the form of a right of reply. While certainly a more cost effective way in which to 
settle the conflict, there remains the risk that defamation can cause real and significant 
damage to the reputation and livelihood of innocent people. It may be that a law suit is 
the only practical means of counteracting this level of harm. 
47 
Further to arguments of self-regulation, it has been suggested that a "Cyber-Court" 
could be established to govern disputes on the Internet and incorporated into the 
Internet structure. 48 Despite sparse literature available on the concept and the fact that 
the logistics have not been thoroughly worked through; the idea of a "Cyber-Court" on 
the Internet as a non-legal forum for adversaries to resolve their differences in the short 
term, has been mooted mostly by those in favour of self-regulation and would probably 
entail redressing electronic defamation via the same delivery mechanism in the form of 
published electronic apologies. While it may seem this idea is a logical progression for 
the Internet, is cost effective and addresses jurisdictional issues; a "Cyber-Court" is not 
an appropriate way to deal with controversy involving the rapidly expansion of 
46 
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Above n 45, 112. 
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mainstream methods of communication and might best be reserved as a non-legal way 
of dealing with smaller one-on-one squabbles. First, the right to an untarnished 
reputation has considerable value attached to it by society. The transfer of such matters 
to be challenged in a forum other than a traditional legal one is unlikely to be tolerated 
by those who highly regard their reputations as important and of great weight. 
Secondly, it is unlikely that Judges would be willing to relinquish their jurisdiction in 
such a manner and possibly open the door to future indifference to the law in case this 
should occur with other legal matters. 
While self-regulation may be useful, it is only likely to be beneficial to a limited degree 
because self-regulation of the Internet is unlikely to be able to adequately rectify or 
vindicate genuine grievances of innocent people who have been unjustifiably harmed. 
As a result, self-regulation could be deemed as having little, if any, meaning in the 
defamation and Internet context. 
2 A new tort of defamation 
Having discussed earlier in this paper that existing defamation legislation is not an 
appropriate way of dealing with Internet defamation, it could be that a new common 
law tort of defamation relating specifically to the Internet is a possible option for 
reform. Difficulties between the Prodigy and CompuServe decisions relating to the 
exercise of editorial control and exoneration from liability would first have to be 
overcome. In addition, if defamation on the Internet was to become a new common law 
tort, it would be a challenge for those involved in its development to reconcile two 
competing interests. First, there is the public interest in providing redress for someone 
who has suffered an injustice by being the subject of defamatory material; and, the 
acceptance and aims of the Internet as a means of ensuring freedom of expression and 
openness in the exchange of information and ideas. Placing the balance too far in either 
direction creates problems in terms of failing to protect the reputations of innocent 
people and, on the other hand, breaching s14 of the Bill of Rights Act. 
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3 Defamation legislation encompassing the Internet 
Given increased advances in technology, a clause amending the defence of innocent 
dissemination similar to that proposed in the United Kingdom might also be useful in 
New Zealand by specifically referring to defamatory statements published by electronic 
means.49 In line with the Thompson case, this defence would not offer hands-off 
immunity to ISPs and would not, therefore, protect those who have cause to know they 
are publishing defamatory material. As noted by Dooley, 50 the draft Bill encourages 
sensible use of the Internet by individual users and ISPs without conferring the 
obligation to monitor. To absolve themselves from liability the draft Bill would require 
ISPs to show they were not negligent in their operations and they further had no 
knowledge of the existence of defamatory content. 
It is questionable whether domestic legislation would be an effective remedy for 
defamation given the Internet's borderless environment and disregard for traditional 
legal concepts of jurisdiction. Complicating matters further is the fact that the law is 
typically unable to keep abreast of mundane technological advancements, let alone keep 
pace with the Internet's infinite development. 
B Protecting ISPs 
An initial starting point for regulating the Internet in a defamation sense is the 
development of a realistic and enforceable code of conduct by ISPs. This would allow 
the development of legislation appropriate to the current environment but remains 
flexible enough to embrace future changes. 
49 
50 
Above n 44. 
Above n 31, 47. 
30 
1 A code of conduct 
An international uniform code of conduct adopted by all ISPs would represent a strong 
front as to acceptable standards on the Internet. Violation of the code of conduct, when 
discovered, may mean losing one's right to access the Internet or some other appropriate 
penalty. With open communication between service providers on the Internet, perhaps 
via a database, recalcitrant users could be blacklisted and may therefore have difficulty 
in obtaining a connection with different service providers. Liability on the part of 
service providers for the subsequent infractions of users might also be effective; 
constituting negligence by offering a service agreement to a blacklisted person in favour 
of their own commercial gain. While only a very basic outline of what might go into a 
code of conduct, a framework, not unlike that for broadcasting standards, based around 
these guidelines may assist in removing, or at least reducing, the incidence of 
defamation on the Internet. The difficulty with this, however, is that unlike codes of 
conduct used for broadcasting standards, ISPs are unlikely to have similar monitoring 
capabilities or authority. 
2 A voiding a finding of liability for an ISP 
In addition to a code of conduct, it would be prudent for ISPs to adopt other security 
measures in an effort to minimise their own liability in defamation claims by 
identifying the original author. 
Unlike traditional modes of communication, ISPs have less opportunity to review the 
content of material published on the Internet due to the characteristics and speed of the 
Internet as described earlier in this paper. The cases so far suggest that service 
providers may be seen as having some responsibility for defamatory material. As can 
be seen in the Prodigy decision, there may be some merit in adopting a hands-off 
approach but, as mentioned earlier, this may result in a finding of negligence. Instead, 
the best position a service provider might adopt is one between the two extremes of 
refusing to monitor content and proclaiming to oversee all material placed via their 
system. Either extreme is likely to result in a finding of liability against an ISP. A set 
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of guidelines should be incorporated into the suggested code of conduct with the 
assertion that it is the individual user's responsibility to ensure messages do not 
encroach on the rights of others. In further reserving the right to edit and remove 
defamatory material, it would be a cautious move on the part of an ISP to declare that 
resources can only allow for limited monitoring of messages and that severe 
repercussions will follow in the event a message is traced back to the original poster. 
Similarly, service agreements with users and other suppliers of information should also 
spell out areas where the service provider does monitor and control content and accepts 
liability, distinguishing those areas where the service provider acts as a mere vehicle for 
access and will not accept liability. Service contracts should also identify individuals 
by names, addresses and contact details, perhaps including a traceable on-line usercode 
to ensure that users can be later identified by the service provider if this is required. 
Policy difficulties that run against this argument, however, relate to issues of privacy 
and the right to go about one' s business without interference. Also at issue is the 
possibility that the use of this type of identification procedure may inhibit 
communications between people in the likelihood it may later be traced back to them; it 
is perhaps also important to remember that not everything that is anonymous is sinister. 
Insurance against misuse is also essential due to sizeable damages awards that are often 
made in defamation cases. Home pages or other easily accessible sites should also be 
available on-line and state in plain language that the Internet is not to be used for the 
publication of defamatory material is also worthy of consideration. 
Employers should also contemplate similar actions with employees if their place of 
business involves using the Internet. In forbidding employees to use work computers to 
send defamatory messages or alternatively seeking an indemnity from employees for 
statements made via e-mail, employers can be held as attempting to absolve themselves 
from liability. Essentially the employer would be showing that defamatory material 
which originates from the particular workplace is not the employer's responsibility 
because such actions are outside the authority of the employee concerned. 
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While not a cure-all for eliminating defamation on the Internet, the methods described 
above constitute a small step in the right direction and attempt to place responsibility 
with individual users of the Internet as compared to service providers. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Liability for defamation on the Internet has not just been isolated to individuals. 
Corporations are liable for the actions of employees and would prove to be attractive 
targets for law suits due to their ability to meet the payment of damages. What can be 
ascertained from cases such as CompuServe and Prodigy is that users of the Internet can 
no longer ignore the legal implications of their actions. Like any other publishers with 
a potentially large audience, users must take care not to infringe the legal rights of 
others. If the Internet is to fulfil its potential of becoming a useful tool in society it will 
have to be adequately regulated. While appropriate to a certain extent in cyberspace, 
existing defamation law requires clarification as it applies to the Internet. While it may 
be appropriate that ISPs should bear some responsibility in instances where they have 
acted negligently or failed to exercise sufficient precaution, procedures such as the 
development and implementation of a code of conduct, in conjunction with clear 
guidelines as to user responsibility for defamatory material, insurance policies to guard 
against liability, employee indemnities and clear guidelines, may assist in checking 
against instances of defamation on the Internet. Rather than trying to "pigeonhole" 
instances of defamation which occur on the Internet into existing legal paradigms, New 
Zealand courts need to recognise that the Internet provides a unique type of service 
which does not always fall into the neat rules governing other information carriers such 
as newspapers, television and radio. While this is perhaps the best solution, it will 
admittedly be difficult to achieve given the dynamic and changing characteristics of the 
Internet. 
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The Prodigy case is not easily distin-
guishable from Auvil. In both cases the 
defendant companies could, in theory, 
exercise editorial control over material 
they transmitted, and both had exercised 
that control in the past. In both cases, the 
volume of information meant that it was 
not possible to vet all the material trans-
mitted. It is also important to note that the 
editorial function of Prodigy ' s 'Board 
Leader' only operated once ,the message 
was on the bulletin board, ie once it had 
been published . Prodigy is widely 
expected to be reversed in the near future. 
The English position 
The liability of online service 
providers has not been raised as 
an issue in the UK, but there has 
been considerable discussion in 
legal journals as to whether they 
are publishers of material on bul-
letin boards, ie they might be 
found liable for defamation with-
out fault, or are innocent dissemi-
nators of the material, just as a 
street vendor is an innocent dis-
seminator of the material in the 
newspapers he sells. The position 
of an innoc~ disseminator is 
equivalent to that of a distributor 
in the US. 
Various online service 
providers have adopted a hands-
off approach to policing their sys-
tems to ensure that they are 
viewed as a Cubby-style distribu-
tor or innocent disseminator 
rather than as a Prodigy-style 
publisher. This laissez-faire atti-
tude can only hinder the expansion of the 
information superhighway and may well 
lead to liability for defamation rather than 
avoiding it. 
The defence of innocent dissemination 
has three elements when applied to a net-
work operator: the operator 
1) did not know that the network/bulletin 
board contained the libel complained of; 
2) did not know that material on the net-
work or bulletin board was of a nature 
likely to contain libellous material; and 
3) did not lack knowledge of 1 and 2 
above because of any negligence on the 
operator's part. (See Vistelly v Mudies 
Select Library Ltd [ 1900) 2 QB 170 for the 
original principles.) 
If an operator becomes aware that a bul-
letin board is likely to contain defamatory 
material it will not be able to use this 
defence. However, if an operator closes its 
eyes to the nature of the material on its 
bulletin boards or networks, it will proba-
bly not be able to escape liability . An oper-
ator which states that it does not vet 
material posted on its network will find it 
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difficult to show that it was unaware of 
defamatory material being posted without 
any negligence on its part. A service 
provider will be in a much better position 
if it clearly reserves the right to edit mater-
ial which is offensive, obscene or defama-
tory, whilst cleaily stating that its 
resources are such that it is possible to 
view only a tiny fraction of messages 
posted, and that it is the individual user's 
responsibility to ensure that messages do 
not infringe the provider's guidelines . 
(Obviously the system provider will have 
to have an appropriate set of guidelines .) 
Had Prodigy not expressly taken on 
responsibility for messages appearing on 
its bulletin boards , the case might well 
have been decided differently. 
The sensible solution lies between the 
extremes of claiming to vet all material 
posted and refusing to look at any of it. 
The adoption of either extreme as a policy 
is likely to result in liability for defamatory 
material posted on a provider's system. 
Proposed new law 
In July 1995 the Lord Chancellor's 
Department published a draft Defamation 
Bill reforming, amongst other areas , the 
defence of innocent dissemination . These 
reforms are in the light of advances in 
technology since the defence was first con-
sidered. The relevant clause reads: 
1 (1) In proceedings for defamation it is 
a defence for a person to show that he 
was not primarily responsible for the 
publication of the statement 
complained of and that he did not 
know, and having taken all reasonable 
care had no reason to suspect, that his 
acts involved or contributed to the 
publication of a statement defamatory 
of the Plaintiff. 
( 4) The following shall not be regarded 
for the purposes of this section as 
primarily responsible for the 
publication of a defamatory statement -
( c) in the case of a defamatory statement 
published by electronic means, a person 
involved only -
(i) in processing, making copies of, 
distributing, or selling any electronic 
medium in or on which the statement is 
recorded,or 
(ii) in operating any equipment 
by means of which the 
statement is retrieved, copied 
or distributed. 
The draft Bill goes on to state 
that, in determining whether rea-
sonable care has been exercised, 
the courts are to pay attention to, 
amongst other things, the defen-
dant's responsibility for the con-
tent of the statement or the 
decision to publish it. This will be 
minimal for the average service 
provider. 
This defence is not intended to 
protect those who have cause to 
know that they are publishing 
defamatory material: this will 
include those who refuse to adopt 
a sensible attitude to policing 
their networks. Clearly no blanket 
immunity is intended for service 
providers, nor would one be 
appropriate . The draft Bill 
encourages sensible use by individuals and 
sensible policing by service providers, but 
without imposing an obligation to censor 
or conferring a right to do nothing, and 
requires that the service provider shows 
that it was not responsible for the libel, had 
no knowledge, and was not negligent. 
The draft Bill adopts the position that 
the transmission of a defamatory statement 
over a computer network amounts to libel. 
This agrees with the view expressed at the 
beginning of this article and with the US 
case law. 
One area left open by the draft Bill is 
clarification on where the publication of 
libellous material takes place. The current 
position under English law is that publica-
tion occurs in the place of communication 
rather than creation; and a libellous e-mail 
message received in Swindon from a 
source in Stockholm will be subject to 
English libel laws • 
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